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MAINRESULTS AND
CONCLUSIONS
IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS of this book, there was presented, first,
an exploration of the changes during business cycles in the effective
demand for industrial products, as reflected in the fluctuations of or-
ders placed with manufacturers. The second subject studied was the
response of industry to these changes: the adjustments of output and
shipments, the implications of changes in unfilled orders, and the prob-
lem of determinants of inventory investment. The third subject was
business investment in plant and equipment, included because new or-
ders received by industries that produce machinery and equipment
represent an early stage of the process, along with the contracts for
industrial and commercial construction. Here the principal topics in-
cluded the cyclical behavior of investment orders and contracts, their
main determinants, and their relation to such measures of investment
commitments and realizations as capital appropriations and outlays.
It is difficult to synthesize briefly the results of such a study, but it is
desirable to try. This necessitates concentration on selected points of
importance. The more detailed findings are given in the summaries'that
conclude the substantive chapters of this book, and they need not be
repeated here.
Typical Developments and Relationships
Let us reconstruct what appears to be the typical sequence of events
in the response of producers to fluctuations in demand. One of the
earliest signs of a business revival, at a time when general economic642 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
activity is still depressed, is an upturn in the proportion of industries
(and companies) that experience increases in new orders. This is fol-
lowed by an upturn in the proportion of industries (and companies) that
start increasing their output rates. Later, as the expansion of demand
widens, aggregate new orders turn up, preceding the revival in aggre-
gate industrial production. At business recessions, there is charac-
teristically an analogous sequence of downturns in these diffusion in-
dexes and aggregates.
As a rule, the expansion in demand soon carries new orders above
the levels of production and shipments. Hence, unfilled orders accumu-
late. They increase faster than shipments, and average delivery
periods lengthen. When at a later date new orders start declining, cur-
rent production will continue to rise to fill the volume of order backlogs.
The latter continue increasing, too, although at a slower pace; they turn
down only when new orders fall below the level of shipments.1 Even
then, output may still move up for some time, but its curtailment will
inevitably follow. The ensuing contraction in the industry's activity is,
however, slower than the contraction in new orders, because produc-
tion and deliveries tend to exceed the concurrent inflow of new busi-
ness, as manufacturers work off the backlogs of their past commit-
ments. Unfilled orders begin to decrease faster than shipments, and
average delivery periods shorten. When current demand (new orders)
turns up again, its level is likely to be initially lower than that of out-
put —toolow in the view of most firms to justify an immediate reversal
of their contractive production policies. The direct effects of the in-
crease in new orders will then be limited to a slowdown in backlog
decumulation and, perhaps, in the rate at which output declines. But as
soon as the recovery of new orders carries them above the levels of
current production, the latter will most likely turn up. Backlogs by then
will be increasing, too, which brings us back to the beginning of the
cycle.
As this account implies, new orders generally tend to lead produc-
tion. For goods made to order, they do so by longer intervals and more
'If the contraction in new orders is so weak or short as to expire before descending to the concur-
rent levels of production, it may not bring about any decline in activity at all, but merely reduce
the rates of increase in backlogs and output. A new expansion in demand will then put an end to
these retardations and induce an accelerated increase in output and deliveries. Most of the "extra"
turns in new orders are associated with those expansions or contractions in these series that fail to
reach up or down to the levels of current industrial operations.Main Results and Conclusions 643
regularly than for goods sold from stock, and they also lead shipments.
The leads are on the average longer for durable than for nondurable
manufactures. The largest delivery lags are for heavy made-to-order
equipment and defense products, the smallest for items that are rela-
tively standardized. Many consumer goods and some materials are
shipped promptly upon receipt of order, from stock. Among the goods
made to order, those serving investment in producers' durable equip-
ment and plant are particularly important. New orders and construc-
tion contracts for such capital goods are similar to new capital appro-
priations in their early cyclical timing, and they anticipate investment
activity, whether the latter is measured by output or expenditure. The
relations are distinctly of the distributed-lag type, and the average lags
of business expenditures on plant and equipment behind the new in-
vestment commitments tend to be substantial; it may take three to four
quarters after commitment for about half of the capital outlays to be
made. These lags appear to be positively associated with the height of
the backlog-shipments ratio, and thus probably with the degree of
capacity utilization, in the capital-goods-producing industries. Simi-
larly, turning-point comparisons show that new orders usually pre-
cede deliveries by longer intervals at peaks than at troughs, presumably
because the capacity position of many of the supplying firms is strained
at the top levels of production.
The relative amplitudes of cyclical, irregular, and seasonal fluctua-
tions are systematically larger for new orders than for the correspond-
irig series on production and shipments. This is so partly because out-
put is limited by capacity, while demand (new orders) is not. Another
reason lies in manufacturers' efforts to stabilize production. Firms seek
to make their output variability as small as possible; and they are
probably more strongly motivated and apparently more successful in
this endeavor in those industries that face greater instability of demand
(i.e., greater variability of cyclical and irregular movements in in-
coming business) than in industries where demand is more stable. In
production to order, scheduling of operations on advance orders and
adjustments in delivery periods are the instruments whereby the
course of output and shipments can be made considerably smoother
and subject to smaller cyclical fluctuations than the course of new
orders. The variability of production relative to demand is thereby
reduced, particularly in the machinery and equipment industries.644 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Total business expenditures on plant and equipment, like the corre-
sponding value-of-output series, also show considerably smaller per-
centage changes than the aggregate of new investment orders and con-
tracts.
Industries that produce largely to order hold a small proportion of
their inventories in finished form. These are mainly stocks of output
already sold and in transit to the buyers, and their short-term changes
are largely random. Firms whose unfilled orders expand are likely to
increase their buying of materials, inasmuch as such orders represent
goods that are presold but yet to be produced. Materials and goods in
process (which depend positively on the rate of output) account for the
bulk of the inventories in production to order. In contrast, inventories
in industries that produce mainly to stock include a large component
of finished goods, subject to unintended changes reflecting errors in
sales forecasts. These inventories can act as "buffers" or output
stabilizers and at times they do so because they lag behind other ac-
tivities(e.g., production may still expand after sales have turned
down). However, comparisons of average amplitudes of real new or-
ders, shipments, and output suggest that such effects of finished stocks
are on the whole weak in comparison to the stabilizing role of changes
in order backlogs. Finished inventories and unfilled orders show quite
different patterns of movement, which reflect their very different
sources and composition. The treatment of order backlogs as "nega-
tive inventory" may therefore be very misleading. Both analytical con-
siderations and empirical results indicate that one should expect in-
ventory behavior to differ systematically between industries producing
mainly to stock and industries producing mainly to order, as well as
between stages of fabrication.
The tendency of new orders to turn before both the revivals and the
recessions in aggregate economic activity is general and pronounced,
as is their characteristic of leading production in the industry re-
ceiving the orders. The average leads at business cycle peaks were
longer than those at troughs for a large majority of the series, but the
leads varied considerably from turn to turn, as well as among the dif-
ferent industries. New orders for durable goods other than defense
products show particularly high cyclical conformity and consistent
leading records. The series for nondurable goods industries also led at
most of the postwar recessions and recoveries, but they scored low onMain Results and Conclusions 645
conformityfor the industries that do not report backlogs of unfilled
orders (mainly producers of staple consumer goods). The main cate-
gories with early cyclical timing were new orders for machinery and
equipment and for construction and other materials that are likewise
associated with investment.
The leads of aggregate advance orders averaged about five months
at troughs and eight months at peaks of the business cycles in the
period since 1921, but they appear to have been much shorter in the
decade before World War II and much longer at most peaks of the
postwar period. These differences are related to those observed for
unfilled orders, which had generally small volumes and roughly coin-
cident timing before and during the depression of the thirties but grew
very large in the period covering World War II and the Korean War
and led by long intervals at the peaks of the latter period. When back-
logs are large at the height of the cycle, they can sustain production
for some time, even when the currently received orders are declining.
This tends to prolong the expansion and to extend the leads of orders
at the peaks. A counteracting factor is the growth of manufacturing
capacity, which was reflected in lower backlog-shipments ratios
(shorter average delivery periods) at the successive peaks preceding
the three post-Korean recessions of 1953—60.
Another reason for the longer leads of new orders at some of the
recent business cycle turns is that these intervals include appreciable
leads of manufacturers' outputs. This probably reflects the reduced
relative importance of manufacturing in the economy: reversals in the
activity of this sector now have weaker and slower effects on the other
sectors, which may mean either longer leads or "extra" movements
(as in 1967 when the declines in new orders and industrial production
failed to cause a general downturn).
Other Findings
Over short spans of time, advance orders provide the best available
predictor of output and shipments in those sectors where production
to order is generally important. On the other hand, such orders them-
selves are particularly difficult to forecast with operationally accept-
able errors, which in fact helps explain why the goods concerned are646 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
being manufactured to order. However, the problem of how the aggre-
gates for the major categories of new orders are determined should
be analyzed. What is particularly needed is a tested and validated
explanation of the early timing of new investment commitments. Only
modest progress has been made in this area, partly because the avail-
able data are inadequate. The evidence is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that changing relations among costs, prices, and sales, as summed
up in the profit variables (the levels, changes, margins, and diffusion
of profits), account in a substantial degree for the cyclical behavior,
and especially the tendency to lead, of new investment commitments
(orders and contracts and capital appropriations). However, profits
may also act in some measure as proxies for expectational and finan-
cial factors. The reverse chain of influence, from investment commit-
ments to profits, also has a logical claim to existence, but it seems less
important in the short run, according to the observed characteristics
of the relationships involving these variables.
The accelerator hypothesis, in its current flexible or distributed-lag
form, is likewise not inconsistent with the evidence presented. How-
ever, it appears less suited as an explanation of short-term movements
and turning points in new orders and contracts for plant and equip-
ment, although it may well be more successful as an explanation of
longer trends in this variable. There are indications that interest rates
have been moderately influential in the determination of fixed-invest-
ment commitments, including their cyclical leads, in the postwar
period. In real terms, about four-fifths of the variance of new invest-
ment orders and contracts in the next quarter can be "explained" by
final sales, capital stock, profits, and the long-term interest rate. While
this result is significantly improved by the use of a distributed lag with
geometrically declining weights, the estimates suggest that reaching
the decision to go ahead with an investment project does not involve
very long lags.2
The usefulness of orders data can also be demonstrated in the
analysis of investment in stocks of materials and supplies. Purchases
of materials vary positively with new and unfilled orders for products
2This finding appears reasonable and is consonant with some persuasive independent evidence.
Of course, there are many important open questions in this field that remain unexamined, notably
the role of changes in the money supply and other general monetary and financial factors (except
insofar as it is reflected in the effects of the interest rate and some other variables).Main Results and Conclusions 647
of the purchasing firms, as well as with expectations of higher prices
and longer delivery periods (increases in the backlogs on the suppliers'
books are likely to stimulate such expectations). The adjustments
to changes in demand are rather prompt for the outstanding orders
that represent "stocks on order" for materials; they are slower and
smaller for stocks on hand. Information of this sort travels faster than
goods. Ordering is a cumulative process, and cyclical rises (or declines)
of orders spread vertically as well as horizontally through large areas
of the economy.
Finally, there are various additional factors that modify the pro-
cesses and intervene in the relationships analyzed in this book, and a
few may be mentioned. The accumulation of advance orders and exten-
sions of terms to delivery tend to benefit the suppliers in times of
generally high and rising demand, but as long as some firms have
sufficient reserve capacities they will fill orders more quickly than
others, thereby attracting a greater share of the incoming business.
Thus, retardation in filling orders is promoted by the diffusion as well
as the intensity of increases in demand, but it is counteracted by com-
petition. Price increases may serve to ration demand and check the
growth of order backlogs, but in times of generalized demand pressures
both the selling prices of an industry and its unfilled sales orders tend
to rise. Over time, changes in unfilled orders reflect the varying degree
of excess demand and are positively correlated with price changes.
Data Required for Further Research
There is a definite need for statistics on flows of new orders placed and
stocks of orders outstanding.3 These should be monthly or at least
quarterly time series classified by industries in which the orders
originated and by broad categories of product. To have such data for
producer durable equipment would be of great benefit in studies of the
determinants and behavior of fixed investment. For this purpose, these
series would complement the similarly classified data on new construc-
tion contracts and would be related to data on profits, output, capacity
utilization rates, new and unfilled sales orders, etc., for the industries
It will be recalled that the bulkofthe available information on orders comes from companies that
receive, not from those that place, the order.648 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
concerned. Likewise, information on purchase orders placed and out-
standing for materials would be highly useful in studies of inventory
fluctuations. It is true that the new Census series for market cate-
gories provide some substitute information in lieu of the unavailable
data of the type just described (I have used those series for just this
purpose in parts II and III of this book), but this information is limited
to comprehensive aggregates that are rather crude for the intended use.
Collection of the data from companies that place the orders would per-
mit the compilation of much "cleaner" series as well as the needed
disaggregation by industry.